

Fallacies of Reasoning

How We Fool Ourselves

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7th November, 2019

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Base-Rate / Prosecutor's Fallacy

- "Humans are 54% accurate at recognizing lies."

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- What is the corresponding base-rate of lies?

Base-Rate / Prosecutor's Fallacy

HIV Self-Test

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- "Accuracy greater than 99%"
- "[...] test result is positive. You are probably HIV positive."
- "This means a positive result will be correct 998 out of every 1000 tests."

Bayes' Theorem:

$$p(\text{HIV}|\text{P}) = \frac{p(\text{P}|\text{HIV}) p(\text{HIV})}{p(\text{P})}$$


Bayes' Theorem:

$$\begin{aligned} p(\text{HIV}|\text{P}) &= \frac{p(\text{P}|\text{HIV}) p(\text{HIV})}{p(\text{P})} \\ &= \frac{p(\text{P}|\text{HIV}) p(\text{HIV})}{p(\text{P}|\text{HIV}) p(\text{HIV}) + p(\text{P}|\neg\text{HIV}) p(\neg\text{HIV})} \end{aligned}$$


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
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Base-Rate / Prosecutor's Fallacy

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- Sally Clark; both children, in 1996 and 1998, died of SIDS
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- She was tried and convicted, spent three years in prison before her eventual acquittal

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- Probability of her having killed them about 10%

Base-Rate / Prosecutor's Fallacy


p-Values

- p-Value = $p(\text{Data}|\text{Null})$


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- "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence"

p-Values



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$$p \approx 1/400 = 0.0025 < 0.05$$

Gambler's / Hot-Hand Fallacy

Monte Carlo 1913



Gambler's / Hot-Hand Fallacy

Useless Advice


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- It was completely obvious that the outcome was only determined by chance
- They were given a prediction for every round, and could pay to open it before the coin toss
- They were always told to open it after every toss


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


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
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
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- **Very conservative**

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Hindsight Bias

Captain Hindsight



Hindsight Bias


Clinicopathologic Conferences

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- Afterwards, the pathologist announces the real diagnosis
- 4 cases, 2 easier, 2 harder
- 160 (total) physicians were asked to estimate the prior probabilities for the diagnoses either in foresight or in hindsight



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
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
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
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- All: 35% \rightarrow 45%

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- $N \approx 20$ for every value in plot







Hindsight Bias

Determinations of Negligence

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
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
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- Participants were asked to judge, as a juror, whether the therapist was negligent

Negligence



Negligence



References

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